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PARKER DRILLING MGMT. SERVS., LTD. 
v. NEWTON: DRILLING DOWN ON THE LAW 




In the United States, oil and natural gas are the two largest sources of 
energy consumed, fueling huge portions of the Country’s transportation, 
industrial, and residential needs.
1
 When one imagines the production of oil 
and gas, images of swinging pump-jacks or a network of pipelines often 
come to mind. However, so do images of offshore oilrigs operating on top 
of the vast blue expanse of the ocean. Generally, offshore oilrigs operate off 
of the coast of a country on what is known as the Outer Continental Shelf 
(“OCS”). Oil and gas production from the OCS makes up a significant 
portion of the United States’ energy supply.
2
 In 2019, Offshore Federal 
production produced roughly 683 million barrels of oil and around 1.03 
trillion cubic feet of gas, almost exclusively from just the Gulf of Mexico.
3
 
Energy sourced from the OCS “accounts for about [sixteen] percent of the 
United States’ domestic oil production and [three] percent of domestic 
                                                                                                             
 *  I would like to thank my wife, Connelly, and the editorial board of ONE-J for all of 
their help and support with this work.  
 1. What are the major sources and users of energy in the United States?, AM. 
GEOSCIENCES INST., https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/what-are-
major-sources-and-users-energy-united-states (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).  
 2. Oil and Gas Energy, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/ 
oil-gas-energy (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).  
 3. Id. 
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 Despite the vast amount of production the OCS is 
currently yielding, much of the energy on the United States’ OCS remains 
untapped. Based on a 2016 National Assessment by the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, undiscovered fields on the OCS are estimated to 
contain about ninety billion barrels of oil and 327 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas.
5
 As such, OCS mining activities are an essential part of the 
Trump Administration’s America First Energy Agenda, which is focused on 




Accessing all of the current and potential resources on the OCS requires 
a concerted effort between industry players from the private sector 
operating under the regulatory ambit of the United States federal 
government. However, confusion can arise when the regulations of the 
federal government differ from those imposed by the coastal state off of 
which an OCS oilrig is operating. This note reviews how the Supreme 
Court of the United States recently addressed that confusion and looks at 
potential effects the Court’s decision might have for oil and gas employers 
and employees working on the OCS moving forward. 
II. Law Before the Case 
In 1953 Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(“OCSLA”) which granted the federal government exclusive control and 
jurisdiction over the OCS.
7
 “Before the OCSLA, coastal States and the 
Federal Government disputed who had the right to lease submerged lands 
on the continental shelf.”
8
 The Act “defines the OCS as all submerged lands 
lying seaward of state coastal waters (3 miles off shore), which are under 
U.S. jurisdiction.”
9
 Pursuant to the OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior 
oversees the energy exploration and development of the OCS by granting 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. 
 5. Matt Frye, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Nation’s 
Outer Continental Shelf, 2016a, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/oil-gas-energy/resource-evaluation/resource-assessment/2016a. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).  
 6. Katharaine S. Macgregor, OCS Oil/Gas Development, DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR (July 
12, 2007), https://www.doi.gov/ocl/ocs-oilgas-development.  
 7. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1887 (2019) (citing 
43 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
 8. Id. 
 9. OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem. 
gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/ocs-lands-act-history (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).  
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the Secretary the power to issue oil and gas leases and promulgate all 
necessary regulations to further the OCSLA’s goals.
10
 The purpose of the 
OCSLA is to make the OCS open for exploration, while protecting the 
environment and other national concerns.
11
 The OCSLA enumerates 
“detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the [OCS] 
and for the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed.”
12
 
Under the OCSLA “federal law applies ‘to the same extent as if the [OCS] 
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.’”
13
 
The OCSLA goes on to state the following regarding the application of 
state law on to the OCS: 
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with 
this Act or with other Federal laws and regulations of the 
Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and 
criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter 
adopted, amended, or repealed are hereby declared to be the law 
of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of 
the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed 
structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the 
State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer 
margin of the outer Continental Shelf
14
 
The issue in Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton was the 
interpretation of the OCSLA’s language stating that state laws should be 
adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS, provided “they are applicable 
and not inconsistent with” existing federal laws.
15
 
III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
 The OCSLA establishes that federal law applies to the Outer 
Continental Shelf (“OCS”) and all attachments thereon.
16
 Pursuant to the 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. 
 11. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
 12. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1887 (2019) (citing 
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 (1975)). 
 13. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138)) 
(bracketing contained in original). 
 14. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
 15. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1887–88 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A)). 
 16. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(1) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
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OCSLA, all law on the OCS is federal law which is to be administered by 
federal officials.
17
 The OCSLA goes on to deem OCS-adjacent State laws 
to stand-in as federal law “[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not 
inconsistent with” other federal law.
18
 
From 2013 to 2015, respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner 
Parker Drilling Management Services (“Parker”).
19
 Newton worked on a 
drilling platform operating on the OCS off of the coast of California.
20
 
Newton’s work consisted of fourteen-day shifts on the drilling platform, 
where he would be on duty for twelve hours a day and on standby for the 
remaining twelve hours of the day.
21
 While on standby, and at all times 
during a fourteen-day shift, Newton was required to remain on the drilling 
platform.
22
 Newton was paid “an hourly rate well above California and 
federal minimum wage”
23
 for the twelve hours a day he was on duty, 
however he was not paid for the hours he was on standby.
24
 Herein lies the 
controversy. Newton filed a class action suit in California state courts 
claiming that Parker had violated California minimum wage and overtime 
laws by refusing to pay him while he was on standby.
25
 
B. Procedural History 
In February 2015, Newton filed a putative class action lawsuit in 
California state court, alleging that Parker violated California’s state wage 
and overtime laws.
26
 Parker removed the case to federal court.
27
 The district 
court applied precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, holding that under the OCSLA “federal law governs and state law 
only applies to the extent it is necessary ‘to fill a significant void or gap’ in 
federal law.”
28
 Because the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) 
                                                                                                             
 17. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
 18. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138). 
 19. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 881 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 914 (2019). 
 20. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Newton, 881 F.3d at 1082. 
 25. Parker Drilling , 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 26. Newton, 881 F.3d at 1082. 
 27. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 28. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. CV 15-02517-RGK (AGRx), 
2015 WL 12645746, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2015) (citing Cont'l Oil Co. v. London Steam-
Ship Owners' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 417 F.2d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
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constitutes a comprehensive, gapless federal wage-and-hour scheme and 
Newton’s claims relied on state law, the District Court granted Parker 
judgment on the pleadings.
29
 Newton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.
30
 
Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo,
31
 the Ninth Circuit 
vacated and remanded.
32
 The Ninth Circuit found that under the OCSLA 
state law did not have to fill a gap in federal law to be adopted as surrogate 
federal law, as the district court had concluded.
33
 Rather, the Ninth Circuit 
held that state law was “applicable” under the OCSLA when it “pertained to 
the subject matter at hand.”
34
 The appellate court found that the California 
wage-and-hour law satisfied this standard and was therefore applicable.
35
 
The Ninth Circuit explained that state laws were inconsistent with federal 
laws only where they were “incompatible, incongruous, [or] 
inharmonious.”
36
 Based on this, the Ninth Ciruit held that the California 
state wage-and-hour laws were not inconsistent with the FLSA scheme, and 
as such the California state laws could be applied.
37
 In order to resolve the 




IV. Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court held that where federal law addresses the relevant 
issue, state law does not constitute surrogate federal law on the OCS, 
pursuant to the OCSLA. The Court reasoned that based on statutory 
interpretation of the OCSLA, state laws may be adopted as surrogate 
federal laws only if federal law does not address the issue. The Court found 
that this interpretation was consistent with the federal enclave model, which 
the OCSLA has a textual connection to, as well as the historical 
development of the statute. The Court also reasoned that this interpretation 
was more consistent with the Court’s previous cases construing the 
OCSLA. For these reasons, the Court held that California wage-and-hour 
                                                                                                             
 29. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 30. Newton, 881 F.3d at 1083. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1081–82. 
 33. Id. at 1081. 
 34. Id. at 1090. 
 35. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 36. Newton, 881 F.3d at 1093 (internal citations omitted). 
 37. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1886. 
 38. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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law did not provide the rule for decision on the OCS. Therefore, the Court 
decided that Newton’s OCS-based claims which relied on state law failed, 
and that California’s minimum wage laws did not apply on the OCS 
because the FLSA already addressed the issue. 
A. The Circuit Split 
In Parker Drilling, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding that the OCSLA allows for the use of state laws on the 
OCS, so long as they are "applicable and not inconsistent” with other 
federal laws.
39
 Prior to being vacated, the Ninth Circuit’s decision created a 
circuit split with the Fifth Circuit (where most OCS litigation occurs). An 
understanding of this circuit split helps to shed light on the issues and 
competing arguments adjudicated by the Supreme Court in this case. 
In Continental Oil Co. v. Steam-Ship Owner’s Mutual Insurance 
Association (“Continental”), the Fifth Circuit held that in order for state law 
to be applicable on the OCS, pursuant to the OCSLA, there was a 
requirement that the state law be “necess[ary] to fill a significant void or 
gap” in federal law.
40
 In Continental, a ship collided with and caused 
damage to an offshore drilling platform operating on the OCS off of the 
coast of Louisiana.
41
 The platform owner filed suit against the shipowner’s 
underwriter in Louisiana District Court, attempting to utilize the Louisiana 
Direct Action Statute, a state law.
42
 The Direct Action Statute would have 
permitted the platform owner, who argued that for legal purposes the 
damages occurred in Louisiana, to sue the ships liability insurer directly 
without going through the process of suit and judgment against the 
shipowner first.
43
 The platform owner was attempting to apply Louisiana 
state law despite the fact that the collision was a maritime one, and 
therefore ample rights and remedies under federal Admiralty law existed.
44
 
Based on the purpose and the legislative history of the OCSLA, the Fifth 
Circuit held that in order for Louisiana’s Direct Action statute to be 
“applicable” pursuant to Section 1333(a)(2)(A), there would necessarily 
have to be a gap or void in federal law for the state law to fill. Because the 
court found that no gap existed in federal law, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. at 1893. 
 40. Cont'l Oil Co. v. London S.S. Owners' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 417 F.2d 1030, 1036 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
 41. Id. at 1031. 
 42. Id. at 1033. 
 43. See id. at 1031–33. 
 44. Id. at 1036. 
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that the Direct Action Statute was not applicable pursuant to the OCSLA, 




Despite the legislative history and purpose surrounding the OCSLA 
discussed in the Fifth Circuit’s Continental decision, the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the “applicable and not inconsistent” language of 
Section1333(a)(2)(A) differently.
46
 In vacating the trial court’s decision, 
which relied on Continental,
47
 the Ninth Circuit held that the absence of 
federal law was not a prerequisite to adopting state law as a federal law 
surrogate under the OCSLA.
48
 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s proposition that a void or gap in federal law must necessarily 




In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the words 
“applicable” and “inconsistent,” from Section 1333(a)(2)(A), separately and 
under the tenants of statutory interpretation. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
based on the ordinary meaning of the word “applicable,” and the lack of 
any qualification of the word “applicable” with the word “necessary,” 
which is used as a qualifier in other federal statutes, the OCSLA did not 
appear to require a void or gap in federal law for state law to be 
applicable.
50
 The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the Fifth Circuit’s 
Continental decision relied too heavily on unclear legislative history in 
concluding that state law was only applicable under the OCSLA if it was 
necessary to fill a void in federal law, thereby bolstering their reasoning for 
rejecting this position.
51
 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that 




                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 1040. 
 46. See Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 881 F.3d 1078, 1081–92 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 914 (2019). 
 47. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. CV 15-02517-RGK (AGRx), 
2015 WL 12645746, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2015). 
 48. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 881 F.3d 1078, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 914 (2019). 
 49. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-
138)). 
 50. Id. at 1090–91. 
 51. Id. at 1091. 
 52. Id. at 1093. 
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The Ninth Circuit then held that California wage and hour law was also 
not inconsistent with federal law.
53
 The court started by reasoning that, 
based on the plain meaning of the word “inconsistent,” laws are 
inconsistent when they are “mutually incompatible.”
54
 The court then went 
on to note that, because the FLSA has a provision expressly permitting 
more protective state wage and hour laws, California’s wage and hour laws 
were not “inconsistent” with FLSA.
55
 Based on this, and the applicability 
analysis discussed above, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s wage and 
hour laws could apply on the OCS pursuant to OCSLA §1333(a)(2)(A).
56
 
Understanding this circuit split, and the different lines of reasoning 
employed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in Continental and Parker 
Drilling, serves to elucidate the arguments made by Newton and Parker in 
the later Supreme Court case. Newton, attempting to apply California wage 
and hour law to the work he did on the OCS, argues in congruence with the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding. Newton’s arguments largely focused on the plain 
meaning of the words “applicable” and “inconsistent” from Section 
1333(a)(2)(A). Further, and similar to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, 
Newton makes the argument that Congress could have expressly limited the 
applicability of state law to gap filling voids in federal law, but because 
they did not do so this limitation should not be read in. On the other hand, 
Parker Drilling’s arguments more closely match those of the Fifth Circuit’s 
Continental line of reasoning. Parker Drilling’s arguments before the 
Supreme Court more intently focus on the purpose and legislative history of 
the OCSLA, mirroring the reasoning employed by the Fifth Circuit in an 
effort to prevent California’s state laws from applying over FLSA on the 
OCS. 
B. The Court’s Statutory Interpretation of the OCSLA 
As much of the parties’ arguments centered on the interpretation of the 
“applicable” and “not inconsistent with” language of Section 1332, the 
Court began its interpretation of the statute with an analysis of those two 
words. The Court reasoned that both words were subject to multiple 
interpretations when standing alone.
57
 Therefore, the Court applied the rule 
of statutory interpretation, whereby the words of the statute must be read in 
context and with an understanding of the words placement in the overall 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 1099. 
 54. Id. at 1093 (internal citations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 1097–98. 
 56. Id. at 1099.  
 57. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (2019). 
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 In Parker Drilling, the Court applied this principle to 
decide when state law was “applicable” and “not inconsistent with” federal 
law, such that it could be applied on the OCS as surrogate federal law 
pursuant to the OCSLA.
59
 The Court noted that the OCSLA gives the 
federal government complete jurisdiction over the OCS without reserving 
any jurisdiction for the states, and commands that federal law applies to the 
OCS as if the OCS were an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction within a 
state.
60
 Based on these provisions, the Court held that state law could be 
“applicable” and “not inconsistent with” federal law under the OCSLA only 
where federal law did not address the relevant issue.
61
 
The Court reasoned that the OCSLA makes it clear that “federal law is 
‘exclusive’ in its regulation of [the OCS], and that state law is adopted only 
as surrogate federal law,” thereby extending all federal law to the OCS 
while only adopting some state laws which are then declared to be federal 
laws and are administered by federal officials.
62
 Because of this, the Court 
stated that it would make “little sense to treat the OCS as a mere extension 
of the adjacent State, where state law applies unless it conflicts with federal 
law.”
63
 The Court went on to note that this type of preemption analysis 
would only make sense where overlapping jurisdiction between federal and 
state governments “makes it necessary to decide which law has 
precedence.”
64
 Because the only law on the OCS is federal law, there is no 
need to conduct a preemption analysis, and therefore if federal law has 
addressed the relevant issue then state law is necessarily inconsistent with 
the existing federal law and cannot be adopted as a surrogate.
65
 
C. Further Support for the Court’s Interpretation 
The Court further explained their interpretation, congruent with that of 
the Fifth Circuit and the trial court, based on three other lines of reasoning: 
(1) the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation allowing adjacent state law to govern 
on the OCS, would make much of the OCSLA irrelevant; (2) the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 58. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). 
 59. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1888 (quoting 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 
current through Pub. L. 116-138)). 
 60. Id., at 1888–89 (citing 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(1), 1333(a)(3) & 1333(a)(2)(A) 
(Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138)). 
 61. Id. at 1889. 
 62. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 63. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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“interpretation was consistent with the federal-enclave model[, which] the 
OCSLA expressly invokes”; and (3) the Court’s interpretation is consistent 
with past Supreme Court OCSLA interpretation precedents.
66
 
A main tenant of statutory interpretation is that courts must give effect to 
every clause and word of a statute, if possible.
67
 The Court held that under 
Newton’s interpretation, whereby the OCS would be treated essentially as 
the adjacent state and state law would apply unless preempted, much of the 
OCSLA would be rendered superfluous.
68
 The Court noted that under 
Newton’s interpretation, the OCSLA’s limitation of state laws applying on 
the OCS to only those which are “applicable and not inconsistent” becomes 




The Court also reasoned that the OCSLA’s treatment of the OCS as a 
federal enclave further supported their interpretation. The statute’s 
characterization of the OCS as similar to that of “an area of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction within a state” is a direct textual reference to the OCS 
being considered a federal enclave.
70
 Generally, when an area in a state 
becomes a federal enclave, there is a transfer of jurisdiction whereby state 
law in existence at the time of the transfer remains in force as surrogate 
federal law.
71
 However, state law that conflicts with federal policy at the 
time of the transfer does not continue in force, and state law moving 
forward generally does not apply to the federal enclave.
72
 
The Court reasoned that the statutes treatment of the OCS as a federal 
enclave, through the textual connection discussed above, and the 
“applicable and not inconsistent” limitation placed on OCS-adjacent state’s 
laws, was evidence that the drafters of the OCSLA intended to make the 
law of the OCS federal but with a legal framework that could govern all 
aspects of life on the OCS.
73
 This legal framework consists of federal law 
and previously adopted state law obviating the need to adopt new state 
laws. The Court reasoned that this federal-enclave-type legal framework 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (citing Loughrin v. U.S., 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1890 (citing 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-
138); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 366 (1969)). 
 71. Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1890 (internal citations omitted). 
 72. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 73. Id. (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 27 (1988)). 
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suggested that, pursuant to the OCSLA, state law was not intended to be 
adopted on the OCS where federal law addressed the relevant issue.
74
 
In the final part of its analysis, the Court concluded that its interpretation 
of the OCSLA was more consistent with its precedential interpretation 
construing the statute. In Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. the Court 
considered the OCSLA’s choice of laws provision, considering “whether 
people killed on OCS oilrigs could proceed under” federal law as well as 
state law.
75
 In Rodrigue the Court explained that the OCSLA made it clear 
that federal law was exclusive on the OCS, but that state law could be 
adopted as federal law to supplemented gaps, or fill federal voids, on the 
OCS.
76
 In Rodrigue the Court concluded that because the relevant federal 
law left gaps related to wrongful deaths on the OCS, state law could 
provide the rule for decision.
77
 In Parker Drilling the Court concluded that, 
based on the analysis in Rodrigue and other previously decided cases, a 
consistent interpretation of the OCSLA had emerged: “all law on the OCS 
is federal, and state law serves a supporting role, to be adopted only where 
there is a gap in federal law’s coverage.”
78
 
V. Analysis: Potential Effects of the Decision 
In practice, the Court’s holding in Parker Drilling will favor entities 
doing business on the OCS over employees, providing for a clearer standard 
by which to govern operators of offshore oil rigs, or any entity engaged in 
operations on the OCS. This clearer standard will maintain the status quo of 
employer-employee relations on the OCS, preventing a large increase in 
operating costs from impacting employers who would otherwise have been 
forced to contend with the state laws of every coastal state off of which they 
operate. Overall, this will foster the achievement of U.S. energy goals, 
allowing operators on the OCS to more efficiently work towards the 
domestic exploitation of OCS resources in an effort to further U.S. energy 
independence and revenue generation. The Supreme Court agreed with 
Parker Drilling’s argument, and Fifth Circuit precedent, holding that state 
law is only “applicable” as a gap-filler for federal law.
79
 In agreeing with 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 1890–91. 
 75. Id. at 1891 (citing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352 (1969)). 
 76. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C.A 1333(a)(3) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. 116-138); 
Rodrigue 395 U.S. at 357). 
 77. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 1892. 
 79. Id. at 1888. 
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Parker Drilling’s position, the Court extended the Fifth Circuit’s line of 
reasoning by holding that, even where a party can satisfy both state and 
federal laws, state law can still be “inconsistent” with federal law under 43 
U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A).
80
 This holding answered the novel question of 
which law may be applied on the OCS, when a state statutory scheme and 




Although it may remain unclear what constitutes a “gap” in a federal 
statutory scheme, whereby state law may be adopted as surrogate federal 
law under the OCSLA, the Court’s holding creates a clearer standard under 
which entities operating offshore oil rigs may operate. Previously, the 
circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth circuits made it uncertain for those 
doing business on the OCS whether or not a gap in federal law must 
necessarily exist before state law could be adopted as surrogate federal. The 
Court’s holding now makes it clear for entities operating on the OCS, that 
state law may only be adopted as a gap filler. This holding prevents a 
substantial increase in costs to employers operating on the OCS for several 
reasons. If the Court were to have to agreed with Newton’s position, that 
California’s state wage and hour laws applied on the OCS, a major 
restructuring of the legal considerations required to operate an oil rig on the 
OCS would have been necessitated. A holding for Newton’s position would 
have required employers operating on the OCS to contend with the diverse 
state statutory schemes governing wage and hour laws for all of the coastal 
states off of which they operate. Rather than being able to simply worry 
about compliance with one federal wage and hour scheme, entities would 
have been faced with the burden of complying with a different statutory 
scheme for every oil rig they operate off of the coast of different states. 
This would have resulted in these entities incurring huge legal and 
operating costs over night. For every oilrig and entity operated off of the 
coast of a different state, that entity would be forced to review the states 
wage and hour statutes in order to determine what the minimum wage was, 
whether it was higher or lower than that provided for in FLSA, and what 
activities count as hours worked. These costs would have been compounded 
by the fact that state wage and hour laws typically are more favorable to 
employees rather than employers, when compared to the FLSA.
82
 Further, 
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for any differences between FLSA and the state’s wage and hour scheme, 
employers would have been forced to renegotiate all of their employment 
contracts with employees. The Court’s decision preventing these costs 
being incurred is a win for the end-consumer, as it is likely that any 
necessitated costs would have been passed on to the consumer, had they 
been incurred. 
Vacating the Ninth Circuit’s decision also prevents operators on the OCS 
from having to contend with a swath of potential litigation, whereby they 
would be forced to comply with state law which conflicts with the current 
nature of the federal statutory schemes they were previously operating 
under. Instead, the status quo has been maintained for employer-employee 
relations. This is because the Fifth Circuit’s line or reasoning was upheld by 




This decision is also consistent with international law regarding the 
exploitation of oil on the OCS and will allow United States based 
International oil companies to continue to operate consistently throughout 
the world. This consistency will allow for the continuation of efficient 
operating practices for these energy companies, furthering the United 
States’ goal of energy source diversification. Most nations have signed on 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).
84
 
Although the United States has not ratified the treaty, and is therefore not 
bound by UNCLOS, in practice the United States has accepted nearly all of 
the treaty’s precepts as customary international law. Thus, the United States 
substantially complies with UNCLOS in practice. Generally, UNCLOS is a 
treaty which provides international actors with guidelines on what 
constitutes a nation’s OCS and on how to utilize the natural resources found 
in the world’s seas.
85
 UNCLOS has standardized territorial boundaries, by 
establishing that a nation’s OCS extends 200 nautical miles from the outer 
edge of its continental margin, or up to 350 nautical miles if the nation’s 
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OCS extends beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
86
 Further, UNCLOS 
grants nations an Exclusive Economic Zone within its defined OCS, 
creating an exclusive right to explore and reduce to possession, the 
resources found within the Nation’s OCS. This exclusive jurisdiction over 
the OCS from the UNCLOS is based on customary international law.
87
 
Based on these grants of authority, coastal nations have the power to grant, 
and international parties must obtain, a license to exploit the resources 
found on the OCS.
88
 In this way, when an oil company is seeking to exploit 
resources internationally, they have a uniform body of laws to contend 
with. The oil company need only comply with the laws of the nation which 
they have contracted with for the license to exploit energy from the OCS, as 
well as the uniform body of international law proposed by the UNCLOS. 
Therefore, international law insulates energy companies operating on the 
OCS of foreign jurisdictions from having to contend with sub-federal laws. 
This is consistent with the Court’s decision, insulating energy companies 
operating off of the coast of states from having to contend with differing 
state laws, when federal law comprehensively covers the legal issue. The 
consistency with international law will prevent international energy 
companies engaged in domestic resource exploitation from having to 
substantially alter their existing operating procedures for each state off of 
which they operate. Therefore, the Parker Drilling decision will increase 
the legal and operational efficiency of these companies. This efficiency will 
allow these international oil companies to continue to exploit resources in 
foreign jurisdictions, furthering the United States energy policy goal of 




Further, the Court’s analysis in this case may have repercussions beyond 
those involving the OCS. In Parker Drilling, the Supreme Court engages in 
a “close question of statutory interpretation,” focusing on the context of the 
language within the statute, as opposed to the more textualist based analysis 
used by the Ninth Circuit.
90
 Based on the Court’s analysis, this decision 
may stand for the proposition that textualism must yield to contextualism in 
statutory interpretation, as the Court more heavily focused on the overall 
context of the language within the OCSLA. This is in direct opposition to 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 49.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. See U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, VALUATION OF ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (Jan. 2017).  
 90. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/3
2020]  Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton 657 
 
 
the more textual analysis done by the Ninth Circuit in Newton, which the 
Court ultimately overturned. 
Due to these considerations, the Court’s decision is highly favorable to 
offshore oilrig employers, and in doing so furthers strong policy 
considerations. The Court’s holding promotes legal consistency across the 
OCS for both employers and employees, keeping the increase in legal costs 
which would have been necessitated by a holding adverse to Parker Drilling 
from being passed on to consumers. However, the decision does still raise 
some practical questions. Namely, the question of what constitutes a “gap” 
in federal law, such that state law may apply, remains unsettled. 
As discussed above, the Court held that all law on the OCS is federal 
law, and state law serves only a supporting role of filling in gaps in federal 
law coverage.
91
 However, the Court did not address what constituted a 
“gap” in federal law. Practically, this could create continued confusion for 
employers operating on the OCS and allow for employees to continue to 
bring colorable claims alleging a gap in federal law exists such that 
employee-friendly state law should apply. The term “gap” can be construed 
narrowly or broadly, and this construction could give rise to future 
litigation. It is uncertain if there must be a total absence of relevant federal 
law in order for state law to apply, or if a gap can exist within an otherwise 
applicable body of existing federal law, that simply does not address the 
specifically relevant issue. 
Using the Court’s own case-examples of previous OCSLA litigation 
does little to elucidate a definition. In the Court’s first example, the 
Rodrigue case, the plaintiffs were attempting to bring suit for wrongful 
deaths on OCS oil rigs under state law as well as the federal Death on the 
High Seas Act.
92
 In Rodrigue, the Court concluded that the federal Death on 
the High Seas Act did not apply to the OCS at all, and therefore the rule of 
decision would be provided by state law.
93
 In this example, there was not 
simply a “gap” in applicable federal law, but an absence of applicable 
federal law. In fact, the Court in Rodrigue held that there was no “obstacle 
to the application of state law.”
94
 Thus, in this example, it is obvious that 
state law should apply, and the term “gap” remains ambiguous. Similarly, 
in the Court’s second example, the alleged applicable federal law was held 
not to apply on the OCS at all. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, the Court 
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analyzed whether federal admiralty law or state statutes governed tort 
actions for injuries which occurred on the OCS.
95
 In Huson, the Court 
reasoned that congress had decided not to apply federal admiralty law on 
the OCS at all.
96
 Therefore, again, the question remains if a more narrow 
definition of the term “gap” can encompass a situation where there is an 
applicable body of federal law, however nothing in the body of law address 
the relevant issue itself. 
On first glance, it may appear that the Parker Drilling decision addresses 
this exact scenario, standing for the proposition that a total absence of 
federal law must exist, however this is not the case. In this case, the 
respondent was attempting to apply state law, where federal law 
specifically addressed the issue in question, and thus California’s wage and 
hour laws were found to be inapplicable on the OCS due to the applicability 
of the FLSA pursuant to OCSLA.
97
 The FLSA addresses the specific 
scenario the respondent was attempting to apply California state law to, the 
issue of payment for downtime spent at the location of employment. 
Federal labor regulations govern that “an employee who resides on his 
employer’s premises on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time 
is not considered as working all the time he is on the premises.”
98
 
Therefore, here there was federal law specifically addressing the relevant 
issue. Thus, it remains uncertain if a gap in federal law can exist within a 
body of otherwise applicable federal law. The Parker Drilling decision not 
only stands for the proposition state law serves a gap filling role on the 
OCS, but also reaffirms that state law certainly can still apply.
99
 Because 
the definition of a gap remains uncertain, employers on the OCS must still 
remain vigilant for applicable state law, even in light of Newton’s employer 
friendly holding. 
VI. Conclusion 
The OCS is, and will remain, a considerable source of domestic energy 
which private sector industry actors and the United States federal 
government have an interest in efficiently developing. Moving forward, 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)). 
 96. Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)). 
 97. Id. at 1893. 
 98. 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 (2018). 
 99. David Jordan et al., Offshore Drilling Companies Can Rest Easy: Supreme Court 
Holds California Wage and Hour Law Inapplicable to Certain Rig Workers, LITTLER 
MENDELSON P.C. (Jun. 11, 2019), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ 
offshore-drilling-companies-can-rest-easy-supreme-court-holds.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/3
2020]  Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton 659 
 
 
employers operating oilrigs on the OCS will have a clearer picture of what 
laws govern their actions after the Court’s decision in Parker Drilling. 
Operators on the OCS can continue to function efficiently with the 
understanding that, pursuant to the OCSLA, federal law applies on the OCS 
with state law acting only to fill in any gaps. Although this decision will 
likely inhibit future claims brought by employees working on the OCS 
under employee-friendly-state-law, some questions still remain as to when a 
“gap” in federal law exists. However, the final result in this case heavily 
leans towards maintenance of the status quo for employers looking to 
efficiently exploit energy resources on the OCS. 
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